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Abstract
Financial stability, with an emphasis on the relevance of asset prices stability to the
stability of the overall economy, has become the sub ject of wide discussion among
monetary authorities. Closely related to these issues are the concerns of central bankers
with a bubble economy and its aftermath. After brie‡y surveying the potential links
between …nancial markets and the real economy and its implications for the design of
monetary policy, we illustrate some of the issues in this literature through the analysis
of a simple linear rational expectations model. From this exercise we conclude that the
bene…ts of reacting to asset prices depend crucially on the kind of shock hitting the
economy. Ideally, reacting to the misalignment of equity prices is desirable. However,
the presence of uncertainty in the estimation of the variables to which the policy rule
responds may overturn this conclusion.
“The U.S. slipped into recession in mid-1929 because of tight domestic monetary policy
aimed at stemming speculation on the U.S. stock market. The Great Depression started
in earnest when the stock market crash in the U.S. caused consumers and …rms to
become nervous and therefore to stop buying irreversible durable goods.” (Romer:
1993)
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1 Introduction
With in‡ation stabilised in almost all industrialised countries - see, for example, Cecchetti
and Krause (2001)1 - central banks have moved their attention to …nancial markets and its
institutions.2 Several factors can explain why …nancial markets have become so important for
monetary policymakers. First, the extraordinary development of …nancial markets since the
beginning of the 80s which was accompanied by an increasing importance of stock markets
as a share of families’ wealth in developed countries. To this development have contributed
importantly the deregulation and privatisation since the beginning of the 80s (see, for example,
Shiller: 2000). Second, the world increasing economic interdependence, due to the globalisation
of …nancial markets, contributed to increasing uncertainty and higher asset markets volatility
(see, for example, Krugman: 2000, and, on the latter aspect, Borio, Kennedy and Prouse:
1994). Goodhart (2000), however, associates the increasing volatility of …nancial markets with
…nancial market deregulation and liberalisation. Last but not least, the recovery in last decades
of a trend in economic research that goes back to the 30s, with Irving Fisher’s ideas on the
Great Depression, that places …nancial markets at the centre of business cycles explanations
and highlights their relevance in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
The Japanese recession in the 90s, the US 1991 crisis, the East Asia crisis of 1998, and
the discussion about the potentially damaging e¤ects of a possible bubble economy in the USA
during the 90s have certainly contributed decisively to the attention devoted to the association
of movements in the real economic activity and in …nancial markets.
Closely related to these developments are the recent concerns of central bankers about what
to do in the presence of asset price volatility and, in the more extreme cases, of a bubble economy
and in the aftermath of a bubble burst. These events have motivated several comments, among
which is the widely cited Alan Greenspan’s 1996 speech. There the Chairman of the Federal
Reserve mentioned the importance of asset price stability to the stability of the overall economy,
and, after mentioning the case of the Japanese economy, questioned when should central bankers
be concerned about irrational exuberance in asset prices. Those remarks synthesise two problems
often present in monetary policy discussions. First, facing some sort of “irrational exuberance”
in the stock market should the central bank intervene? The answer to this question depends in
part on the answer to a second question: what are the e¤ects of the developments in the stock
1Cecchetti and Krause (2001) provide evidence of an improvement in macroeconomic performance over 23
countries, in the last two decades, measured as an index of output and in‡ation volatility.
2In Mark Gertler’s (Gertler et al.: 1998) words, “the issue of …nancial stability has become one of the most
discussed issues among monetary authorities.”
2
market on the real economy?
In section 2 we brie‡y survey the potential links between …nancial markets, with a special
emphasis on equity prices, and the real economy and its implications to the monetary trans-
mission mechanism. In section 3 we discuss di¤erent monetary policy approaches to deal with
asset price volatility. In section 4 we employ an exploratory rational expectations model to
examine the more speci…c issues of how equity prices may relate to output and in‡ation and the
appropriate response of monetary policy to equity prices. We discuss how uncertainty in the
estimation of misalignments may change the desirability of reacting to equity prices. Section 5
concludes.
2 The channels by which asset prices impinge on the real econ-
omy
Traditionally, theories of the monetary transmission mechanism have stressed the direct e¤ects
of interest rates and exchange rates on output, and then, indirectly, on in‡ation. However,
an old tradition in macroeconomics that focused on the importance of …nancial markets in the
transmission of the monetary policy has recently been recovered. This renewed interest results
basically from the belief of policymakers and theorists in the existence of causal links between
movements in …nancial markets and output ‡uctuations. From this emerges their relevance
for the making of monetary policy. Furthermore, recall that monetary policy is implemented
through …nancial markets.3 We begin our exposition of these issues start by describing the
links between …nancial markets and the real economy and their implications for the monetary
transmission mechanism.4 We then examine the relevance of equities for real macroeconomic
outcomes in contemporary developed economies.
2.1 Financial markets, the real economy and the transmission mechanism
To …nd a reference to the links between …nancial markets and the behaviour of economic activity
we can go as far back as the 30s, during the Great Depression. At that time several economists,
notably Irving Fisher, considered over-indebtedness and the resulting crisis in the …nancial sys-
3As Blinder (1997) remarks “Monetary policy works through …nancial markets, so perceptions of likely market
reactions must be relevant to policy formulation and actual market reactions must be relevant to the timing and
magnitude of monetary policy e¤ects.”
4Gertler (1988) has a nice description of the role …nancial markets have had in the explanation of output
‡uctuations.
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tem as the main cause of the contraction in output.5 Although Keynes stressed the importance
of …nancial markets for real activity, namely in the determination of investment, his followers
centred their attention on the role of interest rates in the transmission of monetary policy to
the real economy. Thereafter, with a few marginal exceptions, notably Gurley and Shaw (1955),
the role of …nancial markets was for long forgotten in mainstream macroeconomics, either in
its neoclassical or in its Keynesian form. As Bernanke (1993) put it, “in the standard model,
factors such as the …nancial conditions of banks and …rms play no role in a¤ecting investment
or other types of spending.”
Behind that view was the paradigm of perfect information and complete markets. In such a
world the role of the …nancial system is almost inexistent, as one of the most in‡uential results in
this literature shows: the Miller-Modigliani irrelevance theorem. Modigliani and Miller (1958)
showed the irrelevance of the …rms’ …nancial structure under the assumption of competitive
markets and perfect information.
However, developments in the economics of imperfect information in the 70s, notably with
Akerlof (1970), challenged the results of the complete markets literature and allowed a new
understanding of the functioning of credit markets, namely of the crucial role of banks and
other …nancial intermediaries. The imperfect and asymmetric information that characterise
…nancial markets will determine the borrower-lender relationship and the …nancial structure of
…rms. For example, Jensen and Meckling (1976) concluded that with imperfect information and
incentive problems external …nance is more expensive than internal …nance. Thus …rms that
base their investment projects on external …nance will be willing to invest less than …rms that
do not.
The key role of imperfect information in the relationship between borrowers and lenders
is that it makes it costly for banks to obtain information on …rms’ projects. These capital
market imperfections result in an ine¢cient allocation of funds in credit markets and in a sub-
optimal investment level in the economy. That is, if due, for example, to agency costs external
…nance is more costly than internal …nance - that is, we have an external …nance premium -
then investment demand must depend on the …rm’s balance sheet position and the Modigliani-
Miller theorem does not hold anymore. The higher the agency costs the less e¢cient will be
5His debt-de‡ation theory of great depressions, presented in Fisher (1933), works as follows: over-indebtedness
of …rms, created by “new opportunities to invest at a big prospective pro…t” and “easy money” , leading to
liquidation, results in a contraction of …rms’ activity and de‡ation; the decrease in the price level increases the
real debt burden of …rms and precipitates bankruptcies with the consequent decrease of output and in the price
level, trapping the economy in a recession.
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the allocation of funds in credit markets and the lower will be the investment in the economy.
Therefore, Bernanke and Gertler (1989) argue that the level of investment depends positively
on the …rms’ balance sheet position: a higher net worth or cash ‡ow has a positive e¤ect on
investment directly, because it increases the sources of internal …nance, and indirectly because
it reduces the external costs of …nancing, by o¤ering more collateral - see also Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997). Because agency costs vary counter-cyclically - increasing during recessions and
decreasing during expansions - they will have an ampli…cation e¤ect during the cycle. Bernanke
et al. (1996) call this ampli…cation e¤ect of the cycle the …nancial accelerator mechanism.
All these developments have contributed to put the emphasis on the role of credit market
imperfections and …nancial markets in general when explaining economic ‡uctuations. Some
authors - like Mishkin (1978) and Bernanke (1983) - focused on the importance of …nancial
factors in the Great Depression and both concluded on the signi…cant role of the collapse of
the …nancial system in causing and reinforcing the deep economic crisis of the 30s. Bernanke’s
paper recovers Irving Fisher’s idea that the Great Depression was mainly a …nancial crisis and
provided some evidence of the role of non-monetary factors, in contrast with the, until then
prevalent, analysis of Friedman and Schwartz (1963).6 Bernanke and Gertler (1999) argue
that this framework has also been very useful in understanding several other historical and
contemporaneous episodes, more notably the behaviour of the Japanese economy in the 90s.
Another very important in‡uence of the developments described above was on the way
economists and policymakers see the e¤ects of monetary policy and the role of …nancial markets
in the transmission of monetary policy to the real economy. According to this view, imperfec-
tions in capital markets result in a new channel for monetary policy. This “new” channel for
monetary policy is usually known as the credit channel. According to Bernanke and Gertler
(1995) the “credit channel” should be seen as a set of factors that “amplify and propagate con-
ventional interest rate e¤ects,” and can be decomposed into a balance sheet and a bank-lending
channel.
The balance sheet channel captures the potential impact of monetary policy decisions on
…rms’ balance sheets and therefore on its investment ability (Bernanke and Gertler: 1995). For
example, a rise in interest rates that lowers asset prices reduces the market value of borrowers’
collateral. This reduction in value may force some …rms to reduce investment spending as
their ability to borrow declines. From this results an additional impact of monetary policy on
6The strong correlation between money and output, speci…cally between 1929 and 1933, found in Friedman
and Schwartz’s work stressed the importance of money in the explanation of cycles and dwarfed the role of other
…nancial factors.
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the real economy: because agency costs vary counter-cyclically, an increase in interest rates
with the resulting contraction in economic activity helps to deteriorate balance sheets, raising
agency costs and therefore constraining …rms’ investment capacity. This endogenous change in
borrowers’ balance sheets and its e¤ect on economic activity constitutes the …nancial accelerator
mechanism mentioned above. Bernanke et al. (1996) provide empirical evidence supporting the
relevance of the balance sheet channel.
The second, the bank lending channel, captures the e¤ect of monetary policy on banks’
ability to lend and thus on the funds available for …rms’ investment. Kashyap and Stein (1994)
provide empirical evidence on the importance of the bank-lending channel.
Because nowadays equity has an increasing weight on the balance sheet position of …rms
and because of high asset price volatility, we will now concentrate on the importance of stock
markets to the real economy.
2.2 How equity prices impinge on the real economy
Highlighting the relation between equity prices and the real economy, Bernanke and Gertler
(1999) mention that the bust part of the asset price cycle was in many cases associated with
contractions in the real economy. Although it is very di¢cult to obtain accurate estimates of the
e¤ects of changes in asset prices on the real economy, there is some historical evidence that large
asset prices movements can have important e¤ects on the economy. As argued by Bernanke
and Gertler (2001), “asset booms and busts have been important factors in macroeconomic
‡uctuations in both industrial and developing countries.” The same assertion can be found in
Cecchetti et al. (2000), who stress as examples of this relation the cases of the Great Depression
and Japan in the 90s.7
We now brie‡y describe the channels by which equity price movements impinge on the real
economy. The three most likely channels are the households’ wealth e¤ect, Tobin’s q e¤ects and
the …rms’ balance sheet channel.
The relevance of the wealth channel has been increasingly referred to as one of the main
vehicles transmitting changes in asset markets to real economic activity. The wealth e¤ect
describes the in‡uence of asset prices (mainly stock prices) on households’ wealth and then
on aggregate consumption. The increasing number of families that own shares in developed
countries - more than 50% of the families in the United States own stocks, a percentage that
7As Christina Romer (1993) wrote, “The most likely source of the precipitous drop in American consumption
following the stock market crash in 1929 is the crash itself.”
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is even greater in Australia; and even in a country like Germany, where unions are still very
important, more than 20% of the families own stocks - have made the role of this channel
increasingly important through its impact on the households’ wealth (see, for example, Shiller:
2000). Despite the conclusions concerning the e¤ects of the stock market crash on consumption
during the Great Depression (more evidence on the same e¤ect is provided by Temin: 1976),
recent empirical studies have not found a strong or reliable relation between stock market and
consumption - see, for example, Ludvigson and Steindel (1999) and Campbell (1999).
An additional demand-diminishing e¤ect of a stock market crash is the one described by
Christina Romer (1993). According to this author, the extraordinary drop in consumption
during the Great Depression is partly explained by the uncertainty about future incomes due to
the stock market crash. In Romer (1990), the same author used regression analysis to provide
evidence of the role of the stock market crash in explaining the decrease in consumer purchases
of durable goods.
Another channel linking equity prices and real economic activity works through the relative
value of …rms’ capital to its replacement cost, that is, Tobin’s q. An increase (decrease) in
equity prices increases (decreases) the value of capital relative to its replacement cost and thus
stimulates (inhibits) investment demand by …rms. A related issue is the e¤ect of overvaluation
of stocks on investment decisions by …rms. This issue is analysed empirically in Blanchard
et al. (1993). In their regression analysis using time series for the period 1900-1990, these
authors concluded that, although market valuations appear to have a role in the determination
of investment decisions, it is a limited one. However, when commenting on the potential e¤ects of
the increase in stock prices during the last decade, Blanchard (2000) says that empirical evidence
suggests that …rms with overvalued stocks may increase investment beyond what is justi…ed by
fundamentals, the result being an excess of capital accumulation. This same link between equity
prices and the real economy is stressed by William Poole (2001). Poole o¤ers the example of
the dotcom industry (and the extraordinary increase in its stocks - between December 1990
and March 2000, the Nasdaq Telecommunications Index increased approximately 1300 percent)
where “the distorted price signals from the stock market permitted the industry to raise capital
easily and cheaply, which certainly contributed to the overexpansion.”
Besides these direct e¤ects of equity price oscillations on goods and services demand, they
can also have important e¤ects on economic activity through their indirect e¤ects on the …nancial
structure of …rms and on the stability of the …nancial system. Here is a more promising link
between asset prices and the real economy through the above described balance sheet channel
(Bernanke et al.: 1999). As we saw above, capital markets work imperfectly due to information,
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incentive and enforcement problems. In such a world the cost of borrowing depends on the
…nancial position of agents and, therefore, a decrease in asset prices reduces the market value
of borrowers’ collateral and their ability to borrow and then to invest. These e¤ects can be
highly damaging for the economy in the special case when a bubble in asset prices bursts, as
the experiences of the Great Depression and in Japan in the 90s seem to suggest. In this
context, Kent and Lowe (1997) stress that movements in asset prices, by disturbing the process
of …nancial intermediation, may result in an asymmetric e¤ect: declines in asset prices may have
stronger e¤ects on output and in‡ation. That is, the e¤ects of asset prices movements tend to
be more conspicuous when asset prices fall than when they increase; as we will see this e¤ect
once proven to exist may have substantial implications in the de…nition of monetary policy.
3 Monetary policy and asset prices
The already mentioned 1996 speech of the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan,
where he alluded to the irrational exuberance in the American stock market, is the most cited
remark on policymakers’ concerns with movements in the stock market. As the quotation of
Christina Romer at the beginning of this paper suggests, the issue of the appropriate reaction to
movements in the stock markets is discussed and has in‡uenced monetary policy at least since
the 20s and the Great Depression that followed.8 Actually, one of the most famous examples of
those actions was the monetary tightening by the Federal Reserve, in 1928, aiming to prevent
the development of a bubble in the American stock market.9
However, for the reasons mentioned above, the potential e¤ects of stock markets on the
real economy are nowadays certainly more acute: increasing integration of national …nancial
markets and a strengthening of links with real economic activity have reinforced the concerns of
monetary policymakers with movements in equity prices. Thus, several studies have discussed
whether asset prices should be taken into account in the formulation of monetary policy. There
is wide agreement, among both economists and central bankers, that that should be case - see,
for example, Greenspan (1996), Gertler et al. (1998), Bernanke and Gertler (1999), Cecchetti
8This exceptional period of the American economy still motivates a great deal of research. Among the reasons
for that interest is certainly the remarkable movements in the stock market: the 20s were a period of euphoria in
capital markets only surpassed by the exuberance of the 90s. For a very interesting description of the similarities
between these two “eras” see Shiller (2000).
9Hamilton (1987), an important paper on monetary policy in this period, concludes that “the major factor
in‡uencing monetary policy during 1928-29 was surely the stock market”
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et al. (2000), Goodhart and Hofmann (2000), among others.10 However, there is disagreement
on the exact role asset prices should play in the design of monetary policy and how they should
be used in practice. Some authors defend that policymakers should target a broader price index
that includes asset prices (for a discussion of this view see Goodhart: 1999); others argue that
they should only be used in in‡ation forecasts (Bernanke and Gertler: 1999); and others believe
that asset prices should be taken into account in everyday monetary decisions, with policymakers
aiming at stabilising their value around fundamentals (Cecchetti et al.: 2000). We brie‡y discuss
next the arguments of the …rst two approaches. Then we concentrate our attention on the last
issue of wether or not central banks should react to equity prices.
Alchian and Klein (1973) suggested that the traditional Consumer Price Index (CPI) aimed
at measuring household’s purchasing power, and the target of monetary policy, should include
asset prices. Their argument was based on the idea that the purchasing power of households
depends not only on current prices of consumption but also on future prices. Since asset prices
can be seen as a measure of future prices they should therefore be included in the construction
of price indexes.11 Charles Goodhart has been one of the supporters of the replacement of
traditional price indexes targets, like the Consumer Price Index, with a broader measure of the
price level that includes housing and stock prices with an appropriate weight.
The same author also argues for the inclusion of asset prices in the price index to be targeted
by the monetary authority based on the idea that asset prices contribute to improve in‡ation
forecasts. Thus, an increase in asset prices could imply an increase in interest rates even when
conventionally measured in‡ation remains unchanged. This practice could then result in a
better macroeconomic performance, so the argument goes. However, as we discuss below, the
predictive power of asset prices is subject to discussion. Additionally, changes in asset prices
can give wrong indications about future in‡ation given its high volatility and the variety of its
possible origins (Filardo: 2000). Cecchetti et al. (2000) argue that the problems associated with
its implementation make the construction of such an index unpractical. Vickers (1999) shares
the same view.
This interest in the role of asset prices to build in‡ation forecasts was also strengthened by
the fact that a great number of developed and developing countries are now in‡ation targeters
that have made in‡ation forecasts a crucial instrument in policymakers’ actions. An example of
10According to a study by the Centre for Central Banking Studies of the Bank of England, mentioned in
Cecchetti et al (2000), asset prices in‡uence monetary policy in most of the countries questioned.
11Shibuya (1992) shows that their proposed measure of in‡ation can be written as a weighted sum of a traditional
measure of in‡ation and asset price in‡ation.
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information conveyed by asset prices is the information on in‡ation expectations.
Goodhart and Hofmann (2000) analysed the explanatory power of asset prices through the
estimation of equations for CPI in‡ation for seventeen countries and concluded that equity
prices are a “relatively limited predictor of future in‡ation.” However, they concluded that
house prices could help forecast in‡ation. Filardo (2000) also concludes on the bene…ts of
considering housing price in‡ation in the prediction of future consumer price in‡ation, although
“the marginal improvement in forecasting accuracy is fairly small.” Cecchetti et al. (2000) stress
the fact that the role of asset prices in in‡ation forecasts depend crucially on the importance
of the di¤erent channels by which asset prices impinge on the real economy. For instance, the
exchange rate will certainly have a more important role as an input of in‡ation forecasts in
small-open economies - as it happens at the Bank of England - than in a large closed-economy
like the United States (Cecchetti et al.: 2000). Poole (2001) argues that, in the special case of
stock markets, its information is more useful as a supplement of information from other sources.
In the next section we focus at length on the last and more controversial issue of whether,
in order to improve macroeconomic performance, monetary policy should react directly to asset
prices. We discuss di¤erent points of view on this issue and we illustrate some of them by means
of an exploratory model.
4 Should Monetary Policy React to Equity Prices?
Given that there are reasons to suspect that monetary policy can have important e¤ects on
…nancial markets and that asset price volatility may bedamaging, one mayask whethermonetary
policy should react to asset prices. However, the arguments mentioned in the previous section
are not the only arguments sustaining the desirability of reacting to asset prices. Another
argument, following Poole’s (1970) analysis, is that monetary policy should “lean against the
wind” of signi…cant asset price movements if these disturbances originate in the asset markets
themselves (Cecchetti et al.: 2000). In this section we illustrate and discuss this argument by
means of a simpli…ed macro-model. The full model comprises a system of equations describing
the key aspects of the macroeconomy, a loss function re‡ecting the preferences of the central
bank, and a monetary policy rule. Smets (1997) has used a model that is similar in some regards.
Our stylized system of macroeconomic equations is the following:
yt = ®1:Etyt+1 +®2:At¡1¡ ®3:rt¡1+ "dt (1)
¼t = ¯1:¼t¡1+ (1 ¡ ¯1) :Et¼t+1 +¯2:yt ¡ "st (2)
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The variables are intended to represent percent deviations around the steady state. Equa-
tion (1) depicts a simpli…ed aggregate demand equation that includes a leading term for output
capturing the e¤ects of expected income on today’s spending (Etyt+1).12 Output also depends
negatively on the real interest rate (r) with one lag. Aggregate demand incorporates a wealth
e¤ect, either through consumption or investment, resulting from asset price movements as de-
scribed in section 2.2, through the inclusion of the lagged term At¡1.
Equation (2) is a Phillips curve including expected and lagged in‡ation on the right-hand
side as in the New Keynesian form.13 Additionally, in‡ation depends on the output gap with a
lag.
Equation (3) is based on a standard dividend model of asset pricing: it gives equity prices
as a function of next period dividends (assumed to depend on current output and productivity
shocks), other expected future dividends (incorporated in the expected equity price, EtAt+1),
and the interest rate. The coe¢cient on EtAt+1 is the inverse of the gross risk-adjusted rate
of interest, assumed to be approximately 3% following Bernanke et al. (1999). We add a
disturbance ("e) that may, for instance, represent an equity premium shock as mentioned in
Cecchetti et al. (2000). We will interpret this as a non-fundamental shock. An equity premium
shock could be justi…ed by a change in the risk level of equity holdings or in shareholders’
preferences. In our model these changes do not occur, and thus equity shocks will be seen as the
source of misalignments. Equation (4) gives the fundamental value of equities. It is the same as
equation (3), except for the omission of the non-fundamental equity premium shock.
Notice that, although there are misalignments, there are not “bubbles” (in the usual math-
ematical sense) in our model. Thus, the model will not address the issue of whether central
banks should react to asset prices in order to prevent the development of bubbles. A model that
pretends to study that issue must treat bubbles as endogenous in some way, so that the central
banks’ actions may in‡uence their evolution. However, that raises di¢cult technical problems.
Equation (5) de…nes the supply shock as the sum of a persistent component ("sp), an unan-
12This term was …rst derived by McCallum and Nelson (1999) from a fully optimising general equlibrium model.
13The lagged term for in‡ation re‡ects in‡ation persistence, which may result from elements of backward-
lookingness in the wage-setting process (see, for example, Fuher and Moore: 1995).
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ticipated temporary supply shock ("stu), and an anticipated temporary supply shock ("sta).
Equation (6) gives the behaviour of the persistent supply shock. This is assumed to have two
components: one that is anticipated one period before it occurs ("spa), and one that is unan-
ticipated ("spu). The autoregressive coe¢cient should equal unity, if what we wanted was a
permanent shock. However, that would imply the system to be non-stationary. As we will be
interested in computing variances (in order to compare di¤erent policy rules), we reduced the
autoregressive coe¢cient to 0.9. Demand and equity shocks, though not shown, are assumed to
have the same structure as the supply shock.
To this system of equations we add another equation describing the behaviour of the central
bank. We will employ two types of rules:
rt = ¸1:yt +¸2:¼t +¸3:A
¤
t (7)
rt = ±1:Et:¼t+1 + ±2:A
¤
t (8)
Equation (7) is a common monetary policy rule that expresses the real interest rate in terms
of current output and in‡ation deviations - the well-known Taylor Rule, after Taylor (1993)
- with the possible addition of a reaction to asset prices: either to equity prices themselves
(A¤t = At) or to the misalignment in asset prices (A¤t = At ¡ Ft). Later we will discuss the
implications of reacting to one or the other. Equation (8) is an in‡ation-forecast targeting rule,
where the interest rate responds to movements in the expected in‡ation one period-ahead -
therefore providing a good description of in‡ation targeters’ behaviour, as argued in Alexandre
et al. (2001) -, and possibly also to asset prices.14
We assume that the central bank does not observe the shocks that bu¤et the economy.
There is no consensus on most values of the parameters, notably on the degree of in‡ation
persistence. In Table 1 we show the parameter values used in our simulations and their sources.
Two parameters, ®1 and ¯1, are worth of some words. Although adjustment costs that result
in output inertia are observable in the data, we set ®1 = 1, following the theoretical derivation
of McCallum and Nelson (1999). The in‡ation persistence coe¢cient, ¯1, is another parameter
involving high uncertainty (see, for example, Rudebusch: 2000). However, we set ¯1 = 0:9,
implying very high in‡ation persistence.
The values for the parameters in the policy rule will be determined by optimisation of a
loss function, with policymakers minimising the variance of output, in‡ation and the policy
14In Alexandre et al (2001) there is a more detailed description of the signi…cance and relevance of each of these
policy rules.
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instrument:
Loss Function = V (¼t)+ !1:V (yt)+ !2:V (rt ¡ rt¡1)
The inclusion of output and in‡ation in the loss function re‡ects the wide agreement that
they represent the most important concerns of policymakers. As several authors argue - see,
for example, Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and Batini and Haldane (1999) - the inclusion of
output and in‡ation in the loss function is common practice among central bankers, even among
in‡ation targeters. The inclusion of an interest rate smoothing term in the expected loss reduces
volatility of the policy instrument and, in the opinion of Mishkin (1999) and others, re‡ects real
concerns of policymakers, since they are very concerned about …nancial stability.
In our exercise, the same weight is given to the variances of output and in‡ation, with !1 = 1,
and only half of this weight is given to the interest rate volatility term, !2 = 0:5, following
Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and Rudebusch (2000). The variance-covariance matrix of the
errors is assumed to be the identity matrix.
Table 1: Parameters’ values and sources
Parameter Value Source
®1 1.00 see Alexandre et al. (2001)
®2 0.04 see Bernanke et al. (1999)
®3 0.60 see Alexandre et al. (2001)
¯1 0.90 see Alexandre et al. (2001)
¯2 0.40 see Alexandre et al. (2001)
°1 0.05 see Bernanke et al. (1999)
°2 0.97 see Bernanke et al. (1999)
½sp 0.90 persistent shock
To solve this linear rational expectations model, we employed the Schur decomposition as de-
scribed in Soderlind (1999), after writing the model in the Blanchard-Kahn form (see Blanchard
and Kahn, 1980).
4.1 The E¤ects of Shocks
There is a widespread view in the literature that the bene…ts of reacting (or not) to asset
price movements depend crucially on the cause behind its movement. Identifying the source of
asset price movements, namely if they are caused by changes in fundamentals or by changes
unrelated to fundamentals, and its implications for future in‡ation, is required for determining
the appropriate monetary policy response, as argued by Smets (1997) and Cecchetti et al. (2000),
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among others. However, we should stress that this question only makes sense in a world of
imperfect capital markets: in a world of e¢cient capital markets movements in asset prices
re‡ect economic fundamentals and in such a situation the only bene…t of looking at asset prices
would be the information conveyed about the state of the economy.15
Therefore, when asset price movements are driven by non-fundamental factors and a¤ect the
real economy they can then be the cause of economic instability and should, therefore, be taken
into account by policymakers. For example, an increase in equity prices caused by the “irrational
exuberance” of markets and not sustained by improvements in productivity growth that result
in higher pro…ts, is likely to result in in‡ationary pressures and therefore ask for monetary policy
action. The most remarkable instance of non-fundamental movements in asset prices is the case
of a bubble in the stock market, that can be de…ned as “an unsustainable increase in prices
brought on by investors’ buying behaviour rather than by genuine, fundamental information
about value” (Shiller: 2000).
Using our exploratory model we evaluate the e¤ects of di¤erent shocks on the economy and
the potential bene…ts of reacting to asset prices. In this exercise we try to discern the relevance
for monetary policy of movements in asset prices driven by fundamental and non-fundamental
shocks.
We begin with the Taylor Rule. The optimised values for the coe¢cients in the Taylor rule
are ¸1 = 0:17 and ¸2 = 1:71 (assuming that there is no reaction to asset prices: ¸3 = 0).
We …rst display, using the structure in equations (5) and (6) for all categories of shocks
(demand, supply, and equity), the e¤ect of a unit shock on the variables of our system. In
this context, supply shocks that a¤ect asset prices should be seen as changes in fundamentals,
whereas the equity shock, "etut , should be interpreted as a non-fundamental movement in asset
prices.
15For instance, consider the case of exchange rate movements in Australia where the appreciation of the dollar,
in the beginning of the 90s, was the result of an improvement in the terms of trade: in this case, as noticed by
Smets (1997), there was no need for a monetary easing because the positive e¤ect of the increase in the terms of
trade on in‡ation was counteracted by the appreciation of the currency.
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Table 2: E¤ect in period t with an optimised Taylor rule
with ¸3 = 0 with ¸3 = 0:03
Origin yt ¼t At Ft rt yt ¼t At Ft rt
"
dpu
t 1.020 0.454 -7.620 -7.620 0.949 1.118 0.503 -7.450 -7.450 0.825
"dpat 0.470 0.233 -7.792 -7.792 0.477 0.574 0.284 -7.631 -7.613 0.355
"dtut 0.597 0.245 -0.607 -0.607 0.520 0.601 0.247 -0.599 -0.599 0.506
"dtat 0.326 0.158 -0.964 -0.964 0.326 0.335 0.163 -0.948 -0.948 0.306
"sput 2.087 -0.192 2.535 2.535 0.030 2.053 -0.209 2.476 2.476 0.070
"spat 1.295 0.514 1.126 1.126 1.098 1.270 0.502 1.084 1.084 1.105
"stut 0.923 -0.654 1.522 1.522 -0.958 0.910 -0.660 1.500 1.500 -0.925
"stat 0.629 0.192 0.956 0.956 0.435 0.617 0.186 0.934 0.934 0.451
"eput 0.148 0.073 5.420 -2.454 0.150 0.081 0.040 5.303 -2.571 0.241
"epat 0.150 0.074 4.954 -2.684 0.153 0.082 0.040 4.836 -2.802 0.228
"etut 0.013 0.006 0.961 -0.039 0.013 0.007 0.003 0.951 -0.049 0.035
"etat 0.019 0.010 0.888 -0.082 0.020 0.011 0.005 0.872 -0.098 0.037
As discussed in Cecchetti et al. (2000), a persistent unanticipated supply shock results in a
higher asset price and a lower in‡ation. The same is true in the case of a temporary unanticipated
supply shock. However, in the …rst case the change in asset prices is larger, and the change in
in‡ation is smaller. A persistent anticipated supply shock also leads to an increase in asset
prices, but in‡ation also rises. Again, the same is true in the case of a temporary anticipated
supply shock, but the immediate impact is larger in the event of a persistent anticipated supply
shock.
Now let us compare the results obtained above, when the policy rule does not react to asset
prices, to the ones obtained when the policy rule does react to the actual asset prices. We
assume ¸3 = 0:03 and A¤t = At.
The e¤ect on the levels of in‡ation and the output gap of reacting to the level of asset prices
depends on the type of shock. The implication is that the desirability of reacting to asset prices
will hinge on the type of shocks that are more likely to a¤ect the economy. If demand shocks
are predominant, then reacting to the asset prices themselves is destabilising, in terms of both
in‡ation and output. Actually, it would be preferable to react with a negative coe¢cient. In
our model, the optimised values of the policy rule would be ¸1 = 0:20, ¸2 = 1:47, ¸3 = ¡0:05.
Obviously, this implies increasing the variance of equity prices, and thus increasing the possibility
of …nancial crises through the mechanisms discussed in section 2.
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If equity premium shocks are predominant, then reacting to equity prices would be stabilising.
However, in this model this type of shock has little impact on the variables. This impact would
be larger if the value of ®2 (the wealth e¤ect) were bigger. Values of ®2 above 0:14 would
make the optimised ¸3 positive. As for supply shocks, reacting to equity prices stabilises both
in‡ation and output in the case of anticipated shocks, and stabilises only output in the case of
unanticipated shocks.
Additional research showed that exactly the same patterns would emerge in the case of an
in‡ation-forecast targeting rule as in equation (8). Under this rule, the optimised ±2 would be
positive for values of ®2 larger than 0:07.
The conclusion, as in Cecchetti et al. (2000), is that reacting to asset prices themselves is
not a good idea. The desirability of reacting to equity prices depends on the type of shocks
that disturb the economy. Reacting to equity prices is undoubtedly stabilising if those shocks
represent non-fundamental movements in equity prices. Thus, reacting to misalignments would
have the bene…t of not destabilising (nor would it stabilise) output and in‡ation in the event of
a supply or demand shock. When these shocks occur there is no misalignment and therefore no
adjustment of the interest rate. On the other hand, reacting to misalignments would stabilise
in‡ation and output in the event of an equity premium shock. If a positive equity premium
shock occurs, equity prices will rise above fundamentals, thus causing a misalignment which
would call for a (stabilising) increase of the interest rate.
4.2 Should the Central Bank Aim at Financial Stability? The Welfare Func-
tion
Notwithstanding di¤erent points of view about the uncertainty surrounding the determination of
asset prices equilibrium and other issues raised by reacting to asset prices, described below, there
exists some consensus that monetary policy should not aim at asset price stability. According
to that dominant view, monetary policy should concentrate on goods and services in‡ation.
This view implies that asset prices should not be included in the central banker’s loss function,
that is, policymakers should not be concerned with volatility in asset prices in itself. Therefore,
the argument set forth by Cecchetti et al. (2000) - see section 3 - that central bankers should
stabilise asset prices around fundamentals should be understood as a means to stabilise output
and in‡ation. Even authors like Ben Bernanke and Mark Gertler to whom …nancial stability is
a crucial condition for macroeconomic stability - as we saw above - agree that monetary policy
should not aim directly at …nancial stability. We should stress that reacting to asset prices in
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order to stabilise the economy and aiming to stabilise the …nancial markets are two di¤erent
things.
The variance of in‡ation, output, the interest rate, equity prices and fundamentals under the
di¤erent policy rules were computed as in Alexandre et al. (2001) and are presented in Table 3.
The coe¢cients used by each rule are shown in Table 4.
Table 3: Variances under di¤erent policy rules
Variance Loss
Rule yt ¼t At Ft rt Function
TR 66.11 6.04 1098.64 872.93 15.08 76.37
TR+A 65.61 5.54 1108.98 875.82 15.27 75.12
TR+mis. 65.99 5.90 1094.22 874.07 15.10 75.97
IFT 67.51 2.87 1105.87 882.57 14.99 73.16
IFT+A 67.57 2.79 1108.33 883.25 14.00 73.11
IFT+mis. 67.46 2.85 1103.16 883.10 14.98 73.05
Table 4: Optimised coe¢cients
Rule Coe¢cients
yt ¼t Et¼t+1 At At¡ Ft
TR 0.17 1.71 - - -
TR+A 0.20 1.47 - -0.05 -
TR+mis. 0.17 1.66 - - 0.04
IFT - - 3.07 - -
IFT+A - - 2.84 -0.02 -
IFT+mis. - - 2.95 - 0.04
From Table 3 we draw two results. First, in‡ation-forecast targeting rules perform better
than Taylor rules in terms of the overall loss. The improvement comes from a reduction in
in‡ation volatility which compensates for an increase in output volatility. The variance of equity
prices tends to be higher under in‡ation-forecast targeting rules, though only slightly. On the
contrary, the variance of the interest rate is slightly lower under in‡ation-forecast targeting rules.
This means that the increase in the volatility of asset prices under an IFT rule comes from the
increase in the uncertainty surrounding dividends, i.e. output. Second, changes in variances
resulting from reacting to equity prices are relatively small. A more important change occurs,
in this model, when we move from a Taylor rule to an in‡ation-forecast targeting rule.
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4.3 Uncertainty in the Estimation of Misalignments
An issue closely related to this discussion is the estimation of asset price misalignments from its
fundamentals; a question that is not very well understood as emphasized in Gertler et al. (1998).
Actually, the di¢culties raised by this task have been one of the main arguments against the
reaction to asset prices, notably Bernanke and Gertler (1999). However, supporters of a more
active monetary policy, like Cecchetti et al. (2000), argue that the di¢culty in estimating
asset prices misalignments cannot be used as an argument against reacting to asset prices, as
policymakers always need to estimate misalignments, for example, when we estimate the output
gap or forecast in‡ation. If it were a valid argument, then we could not use it to estimate
the output gap or to forecast in‡ation. On the other side, Bernanke and Gertler (2001) argue
that, although there are di¢culties in estimating the output gap, the standard deviations in
the estimation of stock prices fundamentals are certainly far higher. Although the di¢culties
in estimating asset prices misalignments are widely acknowledged, there are several examples
of overvaluation in stock markets that seemed to have generated a general consensus, at least a
posteriori : this is the case of Japan in the end of the eighties and the case of equity prices in
the U.S.A. and in most European countries in the 90s, among others (see, for example, Shiller:
2000).
Initially, we propose to introduce uncertainty in our model by means of adding a random
noise to the “observed” misalignment. That is, policy-makers will react to A¤t = At ¡Ft + ²t,
where ²t is NID, with variance given by n:V (At ¡ Ft). The parameter n is what we will call the
“noise-to-signal ratio.”
In the case of the Taylor rule (TR+mis. in Table 4), a noise-to-signal ratio of about 1=3
would be required for the uncertainty in the misalignment to make it preferable not to react
to misalignments (i.e. employ TR instead). In the case of the in‡ation-forecast targeting rule
(IFT+mis. in Table 4), a noise-to-signal ratio slightly under 1=4 (around 0:23) would be su¢cient
for rule IFT in Table 4 to be preferable.
Now suppose that there is also noise in the values of yt, ¼t and Et¼t+1 observed by the
monetary authority. Assume again that the errors enter additively and are NID with variance
given by n:V (yt), n:V (¼t), and n:V (Et¼t+1), respectively. Thus, we are assuming that the
“noise-to-signal ratio” is the same for all variables. In the case of the Taylor rule, additional
experiments showed that an increase of 0:1 in the noise-to-signal ratio leads to a reduction in
the bene…t of reacting to misalignments approximately equal to 0:005. Given that the bene…t
(di¤erence between the loss function of TR and the loss function of TR+mis. - see Table 3)
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was around 0:4 with a zero noise-to-signal ratio, it will be preferable not to react to asset
prices when the noise-to-signal ratio is around 8, which appears to be implausible. As for the
in‡ation-forecast targeting rule, as the noise-to-signal ration increases, the bene…t of reacting to
misalignments actually increases. This might be signalling that the IFT rule is less “robust” to
errors than the IFT+mis. rule.
The analysis in the previous paragraph was conducted under the assumption of zero-correlation
between the measurement errors. However, it has been argued (e.g. Cecchetti et al.: 2000 -
recall the …rst paragraph in this subsection) that if we there are errors in the estimation of
misalignments, then there will also be errors in the estimation of the other policy variables. The
implication is that the estimation errors are likely to be correlated. Table 5 shows for di¤erent
levels of positive correlation between the errors in the estimation of yt, ¼t and At ¡Ft the cor-
responding level of noise-to-signal ratio that makes the policy-maker indi¤erent between rules
TR and TR+mis. and between rules IFT and IFT+mis..
Table 5: Critical noise-to-signal ratio
Correlation 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
n Taylor R. 0.305 0.155 0.104 0.078 0.063 0.052 0.045 0.039 0.035 0.032
Inf. For. R. 0.386 0.139 0.085 0.061 0.048 0.039 0.033 0.029 0.025 0.023
Apparently, a large noise-to-signal ratio is not required to erase the bene…ts of reacting to
misalignments, if there is some degree of positive correlation between the estimation errors.
Also, when an in‡ation-forecast targeting rule is employed and the correlation is more than 0.1,
a lower noise-to-signal ratio wipes out the bene…ts of reacting to misalignments.
We must stress that these results do not bear on the issue of whether reacting to equity
prices contributes to prevent the emergence of bubbles and, since bubbles that do not come into
being do not burst, thereby reduces macroeconomic instability. What our results show is that it
is possible that the argument that estimation errors cannot be waged against monetary policy
“leaning against the wind” may not be acceptable.
4.4 No bubble busting, please!
Bernanke and Gertler (1999), in their very in‡uential paper, defend that, because price and
…nancial stability are highly complementary and consistent objectives, when policymakers pursue
the former objective they are indirectly contributing to the second. According to this authors,
19
therefore, a ‡exible in‡ation targeting regime16 is the most adequate monetary strategy to deal
with non-fundamental movements in asset prices. That is, according to this monetary strategy
central banks should adjust their policy instrument whenever expected in‡ation deviates from
the target and monetary policy should, therefore, respond to movements in asset prices only
insofar as they a¤ect expected in‡ation.
According to these authors reacting directly to asset prices raises several di¢culties and,
therefore, there are good reasons for policymakers to concentrate exclusively on price stability,
that is, on both in‡ationary and de‡ationary forces. Besides the di¢culties associated with
reacting to asset prices mentioned above, they argue that a ‡exible in‡ation targeting strategy
is the best monetary policy strategy to deal with volatility in asset prices because it favours
macroeconomic stability and, thus, reduces the potential for …nancial panics. Why are price
stability and …nancial stability consistent and mutually reinforcing objectives and why is a
‡exible in‡ation targeting strategy the most adequate framework to achieve both objectives?
Supporters of an in‡ation targeting regime claim that this monetary policy framework helps
to stabilise not only in‡ation but thewhole macroeconomic environment. This monetary strategy
would not only stabilise prices but also …nancial markets. In the opinion of Bernanke and Gertler
(1999) there are several reasons for this potential double bene…cial e¤ect. First, a low in‡ation
environment is in itself bene…cial for …nancial markets stability. Second, “the central bank’s
easing in the face of asset prices decline should help to insulate balance sheets to some degree,
reducing the economy’s vulnerability to further adverse shocks” (Bernanke and Gertler: 1999).
Third, “if …nancial market participants expect the central bank to behave in this countercyclical
manner, rising interest rates when asset prices increases threaten to overheat the economy and
vice versa, it is possible that overreactions in asset prices arising from market psychology and
other non-fundamental forces might be moderated” (Bernanke and Gertler: 1999). Additionally,
an in‡ation target strategy implies that only movements in asset prices that produce in‡ationary
e¤ects motivate a reaction by the policy instrument. To illustrate the harmony between …nancial
and price stability, Gertler, in Gertler et al. (1998), refers to the October 1987 U.S. crash in
the stock market: in that situation, a stable macroeconomic environment allowed the Federal
Reserve to avert a more dramatic …nancial crisis through monetary easing.
However, this reasoning is not without problems. Implicitly the support for an asymmetric
16Bernanke et al. (1999) de…ne in‡ation targeting as a monetary policy framework in which authorities recognise
price stability as the overriding goal of its actions and announce an in‡ation target in accordance. These authors
also emphasise as distinguishing features of this regime the e¤orts to communicate with the public and central
bank’s accountability for achieving these objectives.
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reaction of policy makers can be conveyed with all the potential for moral hazard behaviour on
the part of investors: investors may buy more assets on the expectation that central banks will
cut the interest rates to prevent the market from falling.17 Miller et al. (1999) suggest that
this was actually the behaviour of the Federal Reserve during the 90s and that it contributed to
the stock market climb. However, Alan Greenspan denies the asymmetric character of the Fed
monetary policy: equity prices move asymmetrically not the Fed. They go down very sharply,
asking for very strong monetary policy reactions in order to prevent a …nancial crisis; but they
generally go up very smoothly and slowly.
By the same token, Blinder (1997) alerts to the dangers of central bankers following the
“…nancial market’s lead” that would result from the short term horizon of …nancial markets
and the consequent overreaction of these markets: because …nancial markets are very sensitive
to expectations about what central banks will do, central banks may end doing what markets
want. As Issing refers, in Gertler et al. (1998), this can raise the risk of circularity or the “dog
chasing its tail phenomenon.”18
Another potential problem with this approach, as we have seen, is the key aspect of the
premise of the crucial role of price stability to …nancial stability in the conclusions of Bernanke
and Gertler (1999). If macroeconomic stability is probably the best way to achieve …nancial
stability, as is argued by several authors (see, for example, Gertler et al.: 1998), it also true
that price stability has been mentioned as one of the factors behind stock markets’ irrational
exuberance (Blinder: 1999). Shiller (2000) includes low in‡ation as one of the precipitating
factors of the market climb since 1982 and Kent and Lowe (1997) remark that “While low
and stable in‡ation should reduce the likelihood of an asset-price bubble occurring, it does not
guarantee that bubbles will not occur; the Japanese experience in the late 80s is an obvious
example.” These authors also warn that asset-price bubbles in a low-in‡ation environment may
be more damaging for the economy: since in a low-in‡ation environment falls in nominal asset
prices are more likely, …nancial institutions run a greater risk of not being able to collect the
full collateral value on bad loans.
In short, the main conclusion of Bernanke and Gertler (1999) is “no bubble busting, please.”
Simultaneously, in the presence of an asset price crash they advocate a strong intervention by the
17In Gertler et al. (1998), Issing argues that a tendency for central bankers to react asymmetrically - because
increases in equity are welcome and declines are seen as distressing for real economic activity - can damage central
banks’ credibility.
18The circularity results from the central bank using private sector forecasts which themselves are based on
expected monetary policy. In this case, the anchor that stabilises expectations is missing.
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central bank in order to prevent a …nancial crisis that can be highly disruptive for the economic
system. Their rationale comes from the sense of potential non-linearities and asymmetries in
asset price e¤ects on the real economy: declines in asset prices may have stronger e¤ects on
output and in‡ation, suggesting that monetary policy should react more aggressively to declines
then to increases in asset prices (Crockett: 1998). From their simulation exercise, Bernanke and
Gertler (1999) conclude that in the presence of an asset price shock a more aggressive reaction of
the policy instrument results in better macroeconomic performance and they also acknowledge
that monetary policy may have an important role in face of asset price volatility: their view of
history is that asset price crashes have damaged the economy only when monetary policy did
not react or instead favoured de‡ationary pressures - in this context they add the important
role of an e¢cient regulatory …nancial system and even adequate …scal policies to increase the
public con…dence.19
Shiller (2000), for example, although suggesting that a small increase in interest rates accom-
panied by a public statement that it intends to reduce speculation may be bene…cial, mentions
the cases of the U.S.A. in the 30s and Japan in 1989 as examples of the potentially devastating
e¤ects of a monetary policy response. The action of the Federal Reserve during 1928-30 is also
used in Cogley (1999) to contend that the impossibility of identifying bubbles timely makes any
attempt to stem speculation destabilising. According to Bernanke and Gertler (1999), another
reason for not reacting to asset prices is the unpredictable psychology of investors. Yet, in this
context, Goodfriend, in Gertler et al. (1998), questions why equity markets continue to be so
nervous at the prospect of an increase in interest rates.
5 Conclusion
Improvements in macroeconomic performance, in terms of in‡ation and output stabilisation, over
the last decade combined with increasing volatility in asset prices have shifted the attention of
central bankers and theorists to developments in …nancial markets. Among asset prices much
attention has been devoted to equity prices.
Our discussion seems to suggest that the disagreement between opposers and supporters of
reacting to asset prices is more apparent than real. Both sides agree on the dangers of a stock
19Bernanke and Gertler (1999) do not hesitate to praise the 1987 reaction of the Federal Reserve to the Stock
market crash. Similarly, Goodfriend, in Gertler et al. (1998), refuses any systematic reaction to asset prices,
for all the reasons mentioned above, but strongly supports action by central bankers in order to restore …nancial
stability following a crash in the stock market.
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market crash to the stability of the real economy. The di¤erence between the two views is, in
our opinion, one of degree: Bernanke and Gertler (1999) are more cautious about reacting to
asset price increases given the dangers of generating a …nancial panic; Cecchetti et al. (2000)
and Kent and Lowe (1997) are more venturous. Blanchard (2000), commenting on Bernanke
and Gertler (1999), considers that not reacting to asset prices is a very “attractive” answer: “It
is surely an attractive answer from the point of view of the central bank: having to respond to
bubbles is likely to be unpopular with …nancial investors.”
We conclude that the desirability of reacting to equity prices depends on the type of shocks
disturbing the economy. Although reacting to equity prices would be stabilising if equity pre-
mium shocks are predominant, that would not be the proper policy reaction in the case of
demand and supply shocks. Another conclusion is that in‡ation-forecast targeting rules per-
form better than Taylor rules in terms of the central bank loss function and that the bene…ts of
reacting to asset prices are marginal.
In deciding the appropriate answer of monetary policy to asset prices two important issues
arise: the uncertainty in the estimation of asset prices misalignments and estimation of the
wealth e¤ect. Assuming a commonly mentioned value for the wealth e¤ect, our analysis lead to
the conclusion that a small degree of positive correlation between estimation errors is su¢cient
to make reaction to equity prices undesirable at low “noise-to-signal” ratios.
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